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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM PATTON 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 970489-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(f) of Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Defendant was afforded sufficient discovery? 
2. Whether testimony of alleged ^surprise witness' had a 
prejudicial impact on Appellant? 
1 
Both issues presented in this case represent mixed questions 
of law and fact. As such, there are two applicable standards of 
review. The first is applied to factual findings and the other 
to conclusions of law. As to factual determinations, the 
standard of review is one of clear error. State v. Case/ 884 
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). Conclusions of law, on the other hand 
are reviewed for correctness. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991) . 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Provo City Code § 14.34.080(3). 
No trash, used materials, junk, household 
furniture, appliances, scrap material, equipment or 
parts thereof shall be stored in an open area. The 
accumulation of more than one (1) such item constitutes 
a junk yard as defined in chapter 14.06, Provo City 
Code and must be removed from the property, stored 
within an enclosed building, or be properly located in 
an M-2 zone. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Joan Patton and co-defendant, William Patton were 
served with summons on May 31, 1996, charging that on March 19, 
1996, both defendants were in violation of Provo City Code 
§14.34.080, a Class B misdemeanor. On May 19, 1997, a bench 
trial before the Honorable Gary D. Stott resulted in the 
conviction of both defendants. Defendants were sentenced on June 
23, 1997. Joan Patton filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth 
District Court the same day, commencing this action. On July 23, 
2 
1997, William Patton also filed a Notice of Appeal with the 
Fourth District Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In November of 1995, Anthony Malloy came to work for Provo 
City as a zoning enforcement officer (Tr. at 7). Officer Malloy 
is assigned to a specific geographic area of Provo City (Tr. at 
8). When officer Malloy was assigned to his area, he was given 
all the open files within that area (Tr. 8). Aside from clearing 
up the violations in the continuing files, officer Malloy is 
charged with addressing citizen complaints regarding zoning 
violations in his area (Tr. at 8). 
One of the open files given to officer Malloy concerned 
Defendants' property (Tr. at 8). Defendants' have a history of 
zoning violations based on convictions for zoning violations in 
both 1990 and 1993 by two different judges (Sentencing Transcript 
at 8-9). In 1995, Provo City filed an order to show cause based 
on a continuing problem (Sentencing Transcript at 9-10). 
However, the notice was not filed in a timely manner and the 
Court's jurisdiction to extend Defendants' probation expired at 
the end of that year (Id). At this point, officer Malloy was 
given the file and instructed to verify whether a continuing 
violation existed (Tr. at 8). 
On or about February 23, 1996, officer Malloy visited 
defendants' property and confirmed the continuing existence of 
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junk, trash, and other materials in the yard, in violation of 
Provo City Code §14-34-080 (Tr. at 8-9). Because defendants have 
a sign on their fence warning all local and federal agents to 
stay off the property, no personal contact was made with 
defendants (Tr. at 10). Instead, a letter was sent to defendants 
on February 23, 1996, requesting that they contact the zoning 
office in order that compliance might be obtained (Tr. at 9-10). 
On March 11, 1996, in response to the above letter, officer 
Malloy received a correspondence from defendant Joan Patton (Tr. 
at 13). While different issues were addressed in the letter, 
there was never an expression of willingness to comply with the 
zoning ordinance. A second notice to comply was sent to 
Defendants the same day (Tr. at 12). This time Defendants failed 
to respond altogether (Id). On March 19, 1996, officer Malloy 
returned to Defendants' residence to confirm the continued 
existence of the violation (Id). During this visit, officer 
Malloy was accompanied by another zoning officer, Roger Gonzalez. 
Officer Gonzalez took several photographs of Defendants' yard for 
the purpose of documenting the zoning violation (Id). 
At trial, Defendants objected to the testimony of officer 
Gonzalez. According to testimony by Joan Patton, "I did not 
receive any discovery that Mr. Gonzalez was going to be a 
witness, therefore I have not had a chance to prepare" (Tr. at 
63) . All discovery in this case was conducted informally (Tr. at 
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65). At trial, Gary McGinn, attorney for Provo City, stated: 
Joan Patton has come into my office 
several times. Our office has an open file 
policy. I believe Mr. Humiston, I believe 
also, has come in and asked for discovery. 
In our office if — and to show them, in our 
file — if they come in we'll allow them to 
look at the file, or we just make copies of 
everything that's in the file. We give 
everybody everything, there should be no 
secrets, that's our office policy and that's 
what we do. 
With that, I know as Joan Patton has 
come in several times, we do have a cover 
sheet. It has a list of our officers that 
says, "Anthony Malloy, Roger Gonzalez from 
the zoning department." Any time they come 
in and take a look that's there... 
(Tr. at 64) . 
The Court denied the objection and allowed the testimony of 
officer Gonzalez (Tr. at 66). At the end of the trial, Defendants 
were convicted for violation of Provo City Code 
§ 14.34.080(3). The Court described the basis of its decision in 
the following language: 
In reading the statute and hearing the 
testimony that's been provided by Mr. Malloy 
and Mr. Gonzalez, which is the testimony we 
have, and the testimony of Mr. Keller that we 
had a rather dilapidated neighborhood in 
which the defendants' property complied in 
making it appear to be the same as the 
neighborhood in question, I find that the 
City has met its burden of proof concerning 
the second portion of that charging 
information in Count I, therefore I find the 
defendants guilty as charged. 
From the plain and simple meaning of the 
ordinance, so you have your record on appeal, 
folks, I believe that the evidence has 
sufficiently demonstrated that there are 
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items which consist of junk, stored trash, 
scraps of wood, deteriorated cardboard boxes, 
and even potential food products that looked 
like they had gone bad, from the witnesses 
testimony. 
And with that testimony being the only 
testimony on the record, with nothing else to 
rebut it or to describe what it was, then the 
Court has only one conclusion to draw, and 
that is is it believable or is it not, and I 
find that the City has met its proof with 
respect to belief. 
(Tr. at 115-116). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not err in convicting defendants for 
illegal storage of junk in violation of Provo City Code 
§ 14.34.080(3). Defendants were afforded proper discovery in 
accordance with Plaintiff's standard open-file policy. Assuming 
arguendo that Plaintiff did fail to provide sufficient discovery, 
testimony from the alleged ^surprise witness' had no prejudicial 
impact on Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT OF ILLEGAL 
STORAGE OF JUNK 
A. Defendant was afforded proper discovery in accordance 
with Plaintiff s open file policy 
Requests for discovery are governed by the Utah Rules of 
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Criminal Procedure. According to Rule 16(a), the prosecution 
must, upon request, disclose to the defendant "material or 
information of which he has knowledge" as to any "item of 
evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be 
made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense" (Id.). 
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987), the 
Supreme Court of Utah held that the prosecution must respond to 
discovery requests in a manner which is not misleading. In order 
to achieve this end, the Court articulated two requirements that 
the prosecution must meet in responding to requests for 
discovery: 
First, the prosecution either must produce all of 
the material requested or must identify explicitly 
those portions of the request with respect to which no 
responsive material will be provided. Second, when the 
prosecution agrees to produce any of the material 
requested, it must continue to disclose such material 
on an ongoing basis to the defense. 
Id. 
In this case, the gravamen of Defendants' appeal is based on 
a claim that Provo City failed to provide sufficient discovery. 
Specifically, it is claimed that Plaintiff failed to provide 
Defendants with a witness list. The trial court rejected this 
claim due to the fact that the record contained no request for 
the identification of witnesses (Tr. at 65-66) . Defendants 
concede that "the entire discovery process has been handled very 
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informally" (Sentencing Transcript at 3). 
This informality is an enormous benefit to defendants who 
are not currently required to petition the court or make formal 
written discovery requests to the City. Under the City's current 
open-file policy, defendants have full access to all of the 
information possessed by the prosecution (Tr. at 64). A more 
formal discovery process would inoculate the City from charges 
like those now brought by Defendants. Nevertheless, defendants, 
often appearing pro se, would hardly be served by the adoption of 
an oppressively formal discovery policy. 
In this case, both defendant Joan Patton and Michael 
Humiston, attorney for defendant William Patton, took the 
opportunity of visiting Plaintiff's office to review the file. 
The file contains the charging information as well as a cover 
sheet entitled Provo City Attorney's Office Criminal Information 
Sheet. This sheet has a heading entitled Witnesses (Officers). 
Under that heading, the following is written: Anthony Malloy 
(zoning) and Roger Gonzalez (zoning). (Tr. at 64). 
At trial, defendant William Patton's attorney asserted the 
following: "[E]very document in this file was provided to me in 
discovery except the one that Mr. McGinn is referring to. This 
is the first we've heard about Mr. Gonzalez" (Tr. at 64-65). 
Despite this claim, the cover sheet in question would have been 
in the file. In fact, it is stapled to the rest of the charging 
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documents. It is likely that defendants' claim that they did not 
see the cover sheet is simple oversight on the part of Defendants 
and their counsel. 
Even defendant Joan Patton does not allege deliberate 
subterfuge on the part of the City: "I personally did not feel 
that this one [omission] was done deliberately or maliciously, 
nor do I believe that the oversight was intention[sic] on the 
part of the Provo City prosecutor" (Sentencing Transcript at 5). 
Assuming arguendo that the cover sheet was mysteriously absent on 
those occasions in which defendants reviewed the file, there is 
also mention of officer Gonzalez in another of the file's 
documents. 
In a memorandum dated March 20, 1996 (from officer Molloy to 
Gary McGinn), officer Molloy states the following: "March 19, 
1996, I went with Roger Gonzalez to the site and took the 
attached photos." Like the cover sheet, this memorandum was also 
a part of Defendant's file. This memorandum clearly indicates 
that officer Molloy was accompanied by officer Gonzalez to the 
specific property in question on the day for which the zoning 
violation was charged. Based on the informal nature of the 
discovery process, such a document alone should adequately place 
a defendant on notice. Defendants do not allege that this 
document was absent from the file to which they were given full 
access. 
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Defendants have simply failed to show that Provo City was 
derelict in its duty to provide reasonable discovery. In short, 
by giving Defendants unlimited access to the entire file, 
Plaintiffs fulfilled their duty to provide all materials 
requested. Pursuant to Plaintiff's standard open-file policy, 
Defendants were placed on notice that officer Gonzalez was a 
listed witness. Defendants have failed to establish that they 
were intentionally misled at any point during the discovery 
process. They have also failed to establish that the City was 
derelict in its duty to disclose potential witnesses. Defendants 
had ample opportunity to become aware that Mr. Gonzalez was a 
potential witness. 
B. Testimony of alleged Asurprise witness' had noprejudicial 
impact on Defendant 
Even assuming that Provo City failed to provide adequate 
discovery, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the 
introduction of testimony by officer Gonzalez was prejudicial to 
their case. Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded." 
Thus, the Court must engage in a two-prong analysis. First, 
it must determine whether the trial court erred in allowing 
officer Gonzalez's testimony. Only upon an affirmative response 
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to the above question is further analysis necessary. If the 
Court finds the trial court was in error, it must then determine 
whether the error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant 
reversal. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated the following: 
We have ruled in several cases that the 
Rule 30 phrase "affect the substantial rights 
of a party" means that an error warrants 
reversal "only if a review of the record 
persuades the court that without the error 
there was a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant." 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) (citing State v. 
Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (quoting State v. 
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982)(emphasis added)). 
A ^reasonable likelihood' is only achieved when "the 
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to 
undermine our confidence in the verdict." Horrel v. Utah Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1996)(quoting 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991). 
Even without officer Gonzalez's testimony, it is clear that 
defendants would have nevertheless been convicted in this case. 
Defendants baldly asserts that "all other evidence other 
than Mr. Gonzales' testimony was disregarded by the judge" 
(Defendant's Brief at 14). This statement is demonstrably false. 
In convicting Defendants, the trial judge specifically relied 
upon the testimony of all three witnesses, not just officer 
Gonzalez (Tr. at 115-116). 
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Next, Defendants assert the following: "The court found only 
that there was trash, specifically firewood, in the yard, and 
this was a matter that only Mr, Gonzales had testified to" 
(Defendant's Brief at 13). Again, this assertion is demonstrably 
false. To begin, the Court never found that firewood was present 
on the property. Rather, the court determined that scraps of 
wood were found on the property. (Tr. at 116) . 
Further, Defendants' claim that Mr. Gonzalez was the only 
person to testify concerning scrap wood in the yard is also 
demonstrably false. At various points during the trial, officer 
Molloy also testified that scrap wood was present on the front 
yard: "In the front yard there were lumber -- specific items 
that are listed in that section of the ordinance" (Tr. at 9); 
"There were lumber and other debris. He had things that I would 
see as just being trash that I would remove from the lot, but I 
do not recall the specifics" (Tr. at 24). 
Despite the above statements specifically referring to 
scrap wood, Defendants object to officer Molloy's inability to 
recall greater specifics. In fact, officer Molloy's recollection 
of scrap lumber in the front yard alone is enough to sustain a 
conviction for a violation of § 14.34.080(3). In fact, scrap 
material is clearly listed as a prohibited item. 
In such cases such as this it is impractical to expect a 
zoning officer to produce itemized lists of trash and junk. 
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Often, such accumulations defy itemization. Nonetheless, in the 
instant case, officer Molloy's testimony was not limited to scrap 
wood. In fact, officer Molloy testified as to the existence of 
"lumber" (Tr. at 9), "debris" (Tr. at 24), "trash" (Tr. at 24), 
"junk" (Tr. at 47), "scrap material" (Tr. at 50), and "equipment 
or parts generally" (Tr. at 51). Most of the above items are 
specifically mentioned in the ordinance. As such, officer 
Molloy's testimony, as believed by the court, was more than 
sufficient in and of itself to warrant conviction. 
It should be noted that officer Molloy's testimony was 
corroborated by Defendants' only witness, Brent Keller. While 
being questioned by Defendants, Mr. Keller offered the following: 
The neighborhood -- quite frankly, it's 
not a neighborhood I would like to live in. 
There are numerous trailers with junk in 
them, there are yards with piles of rock and 
debris. One house in particular stands out 
as I went through the neighborhood last 
Friday and again today, there's a carport 
full of cardboard boxes clear up to the 
ceiling. I couldn't even — I imagine there 
were many dozens of these cardboard boxes, 
which is about four houses down from the 
Patton residence. 
A house not to far away, a log house, 
the front yard is full of weeds. Many houses 
in the area are very similar. It's an older 
neighborhood, the houses aren't well kept, 
the yards aren't well kept, they are not the 
immaculate yards that I see in many of the 
other parts of Provo. That's how I'd 
describe the neighborhood. 
Q. Is there a substantial difference 
between the defendant's property and the rest 
of the neighborhood? 
A. Not that I noticed . . . . 
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(Tr. at 93-94) . 
Apparently this testimony was offered in an attempt to show 
inconsistent enforcement of the zoning ordinances. According to 
Defense Counsel: "Our position is that it's an arbitrary 
(inaudible) that Mrs. Patton and Mr. Patton are being singled out 
for no apparent reason . . ." (Tr. at 96). This claim was 
summarily rejected by the Court (Tr. at 97-98). In fact, officer 
Molloy testified that Defendants' were not the only ones on the 
street charged with zoning violations (Tr. at 55). Further, 
officer Molloy testified that the instant charges were 
precipitated by "several calls from concerned residents in 
regards to your property" (Tr. at 56-57). 
Obviously, Mr. Keller's testimony was relied upon heavily by 
the trial court in deciding to convict (Tr. at 115). At 
sentencing, the judge reiterated: 
You folks called a Mr. Keller to testify 
for you as your witness, and Mr. Keller 
described the condition of the your property 
at the time in question, who was your 
witness, as being an eyesore. It was a 
terrible neighborhood, he said, and yours — 
and the condition of your property was 
consistent with the way things look in 
general, it was bad. I mean he painted a 
picture for me that wasn't very pretty, 
certainly not acceptable. 
(Sentencing Transcript at 16-17) . 
As pointed out in Defendant's brief, a number of factors 
must be considered in determining whether a witness' testimony is 
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sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal (Defendant's Brief 
at 14). Among those included are: 
1. The importance of the witness to the prosecution's case; 
2. Whether the testimony is cumulative; 
3. The presence or absence of corroborating or 
contradicting testimony; 
4. The extent of cross examination; and 
5. The overall strength of the case. 
(Defendant's Brief at 14) (citing State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 
902 (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 
1987) . 
In light of the facts present in this case, analysis of the 
above factors weighs in favor of affirming Defendants' 
conviction. First, it has been clearly established that 
sufficient evidence existed to warrant a conviction even without 
the testimony of Mr. Gonzalez. The testimony of Mr. Gonzalez was 
largely cumulative. The thrust of Mr. Gonzalez's testimony 
merely confirmed the existence of the "debris of wood and lumber 
scraps that were laying around throughout the vicinity of the 
yard. . ." (Tr. at 68) . 
The next factor to be considered is the presence or absence 
of corroborating or contradicting testimony. Defendants failed 
to introduce a scintilla of testimony that contradicted either 
the testimony of officer Molloy or officer Gonzalez. On the 
contrary, testimony from Defendants' only witness actually 
corroborated testimony offered by the prosecution witnesses. 
Another factor to be considered is the extent of cross 
examination. Although Mr. Gonzalez was subjected to cross 
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examination by Defendant's counsel, it is claimed that "[c]ross 
examination was limited by the element of surprise . . ." 
(Defendants' Brief at 13). This claim is severely undermined by 
the simple fact that Mr. Gonzalez only testified as to the 
condition of Defendants' property on March 19, 1996. Defendants 
and counsel would be expected to be adequately prepared to 
discuss the condition of the property on the very day of the 
charged offense. Mr. Gonzalez' testimony was very narrow in scope 
and cross examination questions would have been limited to that 
very narrow line of testimony. Mr. Gonzalez was m fact, cross-
examined, and Defendant was not substantially disadvantaged by 
any "surprise." 
Finally, the overall strength of the case must be 
considered. The prosecution's case was supported by every single 
witness presented to the trial court. Defendants failed to offer 
a single word of testimony in contradiction. While the 
prosecution offered specific testimony that the yard was out of 
compliance on the day in question, Defendants were relegated to 
claiming discriminatory enforcement (Tr. at 96) and contesting 
the Constitutionality of the zoning ordinance. (Tr. at 110). In 
accordance with this stratagem, most of the cross examination of 
officer Molloy was focused on whether or not the Provo City Code 
adequately defines common words such as "junk" and "scrap 
material" (Tr. at 47-50). 
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C. Because of Defendant's failure to substantially comply with 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court should decline to 
address the remaining issues. 
In addition to the matters treated above, defendant Joan 
Patton introduced the following four issues for the Court's 
consideration: 
3. Did the defendant have a right to rely on the 
standards of enforcement set by a Court of Competent 
Jurisdiction during prior cases. 
4. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to allow 
evidence of a Court established standard. 
5. The ordinance should be struck down as vague as it 
lacks standards necessary to prevent arbitrary 
enforcement. 
6. The ordinance violates the defendant's 
Constitutional rights in its application by failure to 
provide Equal Protection and Uniform Application. 
(Defendant's Brief at 2). 
Defendant's treatment of the above issues fails 
to meet the minimum standards set by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The pertinent portions of Rule 24 state the 
following: 
(a) Brief of Appellant. The brief of appellant shall 
contain under appropriate headings and in the order 
indicated: 
# • • 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for 
review, including for each issue: the 
standard of appellate review with supporting 
authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing 
that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of 
an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain 
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the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, 
including the grounds for reviewing any issue 
not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on. 
(Rule 24(a)(5)&(9),Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure). 
In 1996, this Court stated: 
"[W]e concede that not every brief filed is in strict 
compliance with our rules." However, to permit 
meaningful appellate review, briefs must comply with 
the briefing requirements sufficiently to "enable us to 
understand . . . what particular errors were allegedly 
made, where in the record those errors can be found, 
and why, under applicable authorities, those errors are 
material ones necessitating reversal or other relief." 
In this case, in which the appellant has failed to 
provide adequate legal analysis and legal authority in 
support of his claims, appellants assertions do not 
permit appellate review. 
Burns v. Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197, 199-200 (Ut. App. 
1996)(quoting Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah 
App. 1988), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) (emphasis 
added). 
With regard to the final four issues introduced in the 
present case, the above language is particularly applicable. 
Defendant has failed to cite to the record showing whether or 
where such issues were preserved in the trial court. In fact, 
nowhere in the defendant's discussion of the above four issues 
do we find any reference or citation to the proceedings of the 
trial court. This inadequacy makes appellate review highly 
impracticable due to a lack of particularity in the charges of 
error. 
Thus, defendant Joan Patton's issues 3, 4, 5, and 6 have not 
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been adequately briefed. "This court has routinely declined to 
consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal." 
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State 
v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 (Utah App. 1992). The Utah Supreme 
Court has held: "[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not 
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research.'' State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
450 (Utah 1988)(quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 
(111. Ct. App. 1981)). At least with respect to the final four 
issues, the defendant's brief is illustrative of the type of case 
the court mentioned above. 
In fact, that portion of the brief (treating the four issues 
in question) amounts to little more than conclusory statements 
which do not provide this court with the analysis necessary to 
review the lower court's ruling. A review of some of the 
defendant's claims is useful for purposes of determining 
compliance with Rule 24. First, defendant admits that she has 
had previous zoning violations,1 and alleges that in convicting 
her in the instant case, the trial court has somehow changed 
previously set standards of compliance. (Defendant's Brief at 15-
16). However, defendant fails to provide any meaningful analysis 
}"This appeal results from the fourth trial and conviction 
of the defendant, Joan Patton for a violation relating to the 
appearance and upkeep of her property" (Defendant's Brief at 15). 
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or any detail whatsoever concerning the alleged changes in 
enforcement. 
Second,the defendant opted to focus on the constitutionality 
of the zoning ordinance in question.(Defendant's Brief at 16). 
Defendant challenges the ordinance as vague and 
arbitrary.(Defendant's Brief at 16). Again, defendant has failed 
to include any citations to the record, nor has any discussion of 
the specific language of the ordinance been advanced in support 
of the allegation. The only authority presented to the Court: 
whatsoever is a case out of Washington state. The cited case is 
not discussed analytically, just mentioned as "supported in part 
by . . . "(Defendant's Brief at 17). 
The very same Washington case is used as the only authority 
to support the defendant's single paragraph alleging the 
"unconstitutional overbreadth'7 of the Provo City zoning 
ordinance. (Defendant's Brief at 17-18). Again, the Washington 
case is the single authority cited for the proposition that the 
Provo ordinance is "void for unreasonableness." (Defendant's 
Brief at 18). Unfortunately, the defendant fails to provide 
adequate discussion of even the Washington case. All that the 
defendant's brief reveals is the fact that the case concerned a 
pedestrian interference statute and a specific intent 
requirement. (Defendant's Brief at 17). 
Defendant's final claim, an equal protection violation, 
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suffers from a similar lack of legal or factual analysis. 
Essentially, the defendant claims that those "on a lower rung of 
the economic ladder" are treated unfairly in the enforcement of 
the zoning ordinance. Having set forth this conclusory 
allegation, the defendant again fails to introduce a scintilla of 
evidence or support from the record to indicate that such 
discrimination has occurred in the present case. 
D. Defendant failed to preserve issues 3,4, 5 and 6 at the 
trial court level therefore those issues may not be 
addressed on appeal. 
Further, issues 3,4,5 and 6 of defendant's brief were not 
properly preserved for appellate review. The general rule is that 
an issue may not be presented to the appellate court that was not 
first presented to the trial court. DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, 
Inc., 884 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1994);Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of 
Education., 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990);Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 
938 (Utah 1987). This Court has held that matters neither raised 
in pleadings, nor put in issue of trial court cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal. Bundv v. Century 
Equipment Co., Inc., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984). 
With respect to issues 3 and 4: Defendant did not adequately 
raise these issues at trial. No legal argument was presented 
regarding defendant's claims of a breach in the trial court's 
standards of enforcement. No pretrial motions were filed 
addressing the issue. 
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With respect to issues 5 and 6: At the pretrial hearing held 
on January 30, 1997 before the Honorable Fred D. Howard, 
defendant made an oral motion to dismiss alleging that the 
ordinance was vague and overbroad. (Transcript of Pretrial 
Hearing at 12) Judge Howard gave the defendant time to brief any 
challenges to the ordinance that she may have had and set a 
hearing on any motions that defendant wanted to file. (Transcript 
of Pretrial Hearing at 14-15). Defendant failed to file any 
motions or brief the court on any constitutional challenges to 
the ordinance. Defendant has failed to preserve these issues for 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the 
testimony of officer Gonzalez. Defendants were given full access 
to the entire file in accordance with Plaintiff's open-file 
policy. Defendants should have thus been on notice that officer 
Gonzalez was a witness. Further, even if this court were to 
find error in the trial court's decision to allow officer 
Gonzalez to testify, his testimony was not sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant reversal. Finally, because of the 
Defendant's failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Court should decline to address the remainder of 
the issues introduced by the defendant. 
Based on the foregoing arguments, Plaintiff requests that 
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Defendants' conviction for illegal storage of junk in violation 
of Provo City Code § 14.34.080(3) be affirmed. 
-oh 
Dated this 1 I day of April, 1998. 
Christine M. Petersen 
Attorney for Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
25 
1 I basis in the zoning contacts? 
2 A. I'd work with the zoning ordinance, the 
3 zoning map, other supporting documentation that Utah 
4 County has; building permits, Utah County ownership 
5 records. 
6 Q. And how long did you work there? 
7 A. Approximately six months. 
8 Q. And then from there you've went to -- got 
9 employment with Provo City; is that correct? 
10 A. That is correct. 
11 Q. What type of materials in relation to zoning 
12 do you use on a daily basis for Provo City? 
13 A. I use the zoning ordinance and the zoning 
14 map. We have a case file history of previous cases 
15 that we've worked with, also with building permit 
16 records and also the Utah County Recorder's Office 
17 information. 
18 Q. What was the approximate date of when you 
IS came to work for Provo City? 
20 A. It was in November of 1995. 
21 Q. At that time when you came to work what 
22 duties were assigned to you? 
23 I A. In our office different areas are assigned 
24 to a specific zoning officer so that we can take care 
25 of specific areas and follow through with those cases. 
I was assigned a specific area of Provo City. 
Q. After you were assigned this specific area 
what did you do? 
A. I was given several cases, and also we 
receive zoning complaints that are called in or people 
come into the counter, and we receive from those --
that information we proceed to investigate whether 
there is any violation, and then I act on that kind of 
information. 
Q. Were you given a file concerning the Patton 
property? 
A. I was. 
Q. What were your instructions with that file? 
A. I was informed that I should proceed to go 
out into the field and verify that there was still a 
continuing violation. I did that, and there was a 
violation in my opinion at the site. 
Q. What violation are you talking about? 
A. Violation of Section 14-34-080, the 
accumulation of junk, trash and other materials in the 
yard. 
Q. And you say you went to the site? 
A. I did, I went out to the property. 
Q. And what did you do when you arrived there? 
A. I looked around the site to see if there 
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were materials that are specified in Section 14-34-030 
in the yard area. I did not go onto the site, I 
viewed the site from the public right-of-way. or the 
sidewalk. 
Q. At that point what types of materials did 
you see? 
A. I saw numerous materials that I don't recaLl 
specifics on. In the front yard area there were 
lumber -- specific items that are listed in that 
section of the ordinance. There was in addition a 
trailer in the front yard area that appeared to be 
inoperable, which is a violation of the city 
ordinance. 
I also saw the fence that was on the front 
property line, and it was in excess of three feet in 
height, which is restricted by the city zoning 
ordinance. 
Q. Mr. Malloy, on what day approximately was 
this that you went out to the property for the first 
time? 
A. I have here a note that I did go to the site 
and sent the first letter out February 23, 1996. 
Q. So it was sometime around--
A. Around that date, either that day or the day 
before the letter was sent to William and Joan Patton 
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I went to the site. 
Now you indicated you sent 3 letter whac 
relationship to your visit? 
The letter went out on February 23rd. In 
that Letter I informer wucis ol Lhe property the 
information I obtained from the Utah County Recorder's 
Office that the office had been contacted regarding a 
zoning vi:iaLuii, ! i.dd been t. c the site and verified 
the violation was in existence, and requested that 
they contact me in order that ve can gain compliance 
f:ji the zoning ordinance (inaudible) . 
Q. To whom was this letter sent? 
A. It was to William and Joan Patton. 
Q. And why did you send a letter to William and 
Joan Patton? 
A. !"n '!-ni^ «-ituat i oris n<- office wiJl contact 
the people physically at the site. In this situation 
I decided not to, since there is a notice posted on 
the fence ro al] local and federal agents to not enter 
the property. 
Q. And so is that the reason you didn't attempt 
t: i) ma k: e p e r s on a 1 c on t a c t ? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. what did the letter contain? What did you 
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March llth I actually did receive a letter from Joan 
Patton. Different issues were addressed in the 
letter, but at no time did I receive the opinion they 
were willing to comply with the city zoning ordinance. 
THE COURT: What was the date of the letter? 
THE WITNESS: That was March 11, 1996. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, how would you like 
to do these? Do you want these marked individually, 
or group them together as A--
THE COURT: No, just mark them 1, 2, 3 et 
cetera. How many do you have? 
MR. MCGINN: I don't know. I have--
THE COURT: Do you have dozens or have you 
got a few? 
MR. MCGINN: I've got approximately 10. 
THE COURT: Okay, mark them that way. 
MR. MCGINN: Okay. 
MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, I have shown these 
photographs to counsel. May I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: You may. Have you shown them co 
Ms. Patton? 
MR. MCGINN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q. BY MR. MCGINN: Mr. Malloy, would you take a 
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1 here today when you're testifying, would you please 
2 just refer a 11 you.i comment s t ; : • t:he vi :> 1 a t i o n t hat 
3 exists on this lot, and violations on any other lot 
4 will be saved for another day? 
5 A . I w:i 1 1 . 
6 Q. Thank you, would you please take the stand 
7 again. 
8 (Witness resumes stand) 
9 Now the lot at 1067 North 750 West, as what 
10 -~ described on the board, showing a residence and 
11 a parking pad, correct? 
12. A.' It is. 
13 Q. In that front yard area what types of 
14 materials did you see on that day that you felt were a 
15 violation of 14-34-080? 
16 A. I dc not recall speed fics, but there were 
17 I numerous violations, on that lot. In addition to the 
18 trailer, that is the most obvious or most apparent 
19 violation when you first 1 r>ok "it the lot. 
20 Q. Do you remember in general what types c: 
21 materials were on that? 
22 A. There were lumber and other debris. He had 
23 things that I would see as just being trash that I 
24 would remove from a lot, but I do not recall the 
25 specifics. i 
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a citizen complaint? 
A. I had received and have received several 
calls from concerned residents in regards to your 
property. 
Q. And who would those residents be? 
A. I don't have that information in front of 
me. 
Q. But you do have it on file? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Was a charge levied against this property 
because it had deteriorated to a level that existed at 
the time prior to the charge? 
A. I cannot really answer that. When I started 
with the City I was given numerous cases and asked to 
investigate those, and one such case was your 
property. Because there had been previous work on it 
I did browse through the existing file, but did not 
use the material in there. I went out to the site and 
saw an existing violation and proceeded with my action 
as of that date in contacting you and requesting that 
the property be brought into compliance. 
MS. PATTON: I have no more questions for 
the witness at this time, your Honor, but would like 
to reserve the right to inquire the witness further. 
THE COURT: You may. 
57 
Mr Humiston? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
B 1 I II ! HUMTc,Tn' ' T I: 
Q. iO" Malloy, starting from your most recent 
testimony, ; understand that you say that you have 
recei v ed c. - jmplaints? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. You have personally received citizen 
complaints from, neighbors ? 
I have spoken with neighbors or people who 
s a y they are neighbors during the process of this 
case,, that is correct... 
Q Did you initiate the contact with those 
neighbors? 
I did not. 
C Have those complaints come in before or 
after we'1; re 1 ast met at th:i s ::(:)i i:r t (inaudible) 
February (inaudible)? 
A. I have received contact prior to that date 
and s i i ice that da tie wi th quest ions regarding what wa s 
going to happen, and that the yard is in - needs some 
attention. 
Q. Is :i t: nc ti t:i t le that you stated a ,/i: t:l lat : t::i i lie 
in February that there had in fact been no citizen 
complaints? 
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property in December of 1994. The question is whether 
or not the property was in violation on March 19, 
1996. 
MR. HUMISTON: May I approach? 
THE COURT: You bet, you sure may. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: I would like to ask what the 
condition of the properties in the neighborhood that 
the defendant resides in, as you would have possibly 
seen this morning? 
A. The neighborhood -- quite frankly, it's not 
a neighborhood I would like to live in. There are 
numerous trailers with junk in them, there are yards 
with piles of rocks and debris. One house in 
particular stands out as I went through the 
neighborhood last Friday and again today, there's a 
carport full of cardboard boxes clear up to the 
ceiling. I couldn't even -- I imagine there were many 
dozens of these cardboard boxes, which is about four 
houses down from the Patton residence. 
A house not too far away, a log house, the 
front yard is full of weeds. Many houses in the area 
are very similar. It's an older neighborhood, the 
houses aren't well kept, the yards aren't well kept, 
they are not immaculate yards that I see in many of 
the other parts of Provo. That's how I'd describe the 
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neighborhood. 
Q. Is there a substantial difference between 
the defendant s proper t> ai id 1 :1 i< = • i e s t : • if the 
neighborhood? 
A
 *:ct that I noticed, not unless you go out 
probably two blocks away to w] le i e a h i : ai id new 
apartment - - a large apartment complex has been built, 
there the yards are very nice, the lawn is cut, 
watered regularly, looks quite nice, I: ait: once y oi i get 
past that the houses, in my opinion, are not that 
different. 
'*? PATTON: Just one moment, your Honor 
Your Honor, I've never done this before, so may I 
app r o a ch e11e r ? 
THE COURT: Let's have any photographs 
you've got marked as exhibits. You want to tell me 
when they were taken? 
MS. PATTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, tell me when they were 
taken. 
MS. PATTON: Today, although the camera says 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Can y on tell me the releva ncy of 
photos taken today? Ji you've cleaned it all up~~ 
MS. PATTON: This isn't mine, this is--
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the City is working on those. I just don't understand 
the relevance. 
MR. HUMISTON: May I speak to that, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. HUMISTON: In Ms. Patton's cross 
examination of Mr. Malloy, there was substantial 
testimony that a lot of these determinations are 
subjective. We're dealing here basically with an 
administrative agent, Mr. Malloy, who makes subjective 
determinations. 
Our position is that it's an arbitrary 
(inaudible) that Mrs. Patton and Mr. Patton are being 
singled out for no apparent reason, and this gees to 
the fact that this testimony would -- this evidence 
would (inaudible) numerous violations. 
As far as whether any of these specific ones 
are being prosecuted, we would find that if Mr. Malloy 
cares to testify to that, but we're not aware of any. 
We are --we think it's significant that there are 
numerous trailers on the street, numerous trailers 
that have been parked there for a long time, and as 
far as you can tell, the trailer seems to be the sole 
issue at this point. 
MR. MCGINN: Objection to that. We're not 
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1 talking about any trailer on the street. We're 
2 talking about perhaps an inoperable vehicle in the 
3 front yard, or -- and/or we're talking about garbage, 
4 trash, junk, those types of materials in the front 
5 yard. That's what we're here about, we're not here 
6 about trailers in the streets, whether people have 
7 [ things parked--
MR HUMISTON: Maybe we're arguing semantics 
here, but by on the street I mean other neighbors on 
10 I the street, there are trailers in driveways, trailers 
11 * - -ont of hoi ises We have evi dence 
I 
12 . : :.,- . rind we are curious as to why the 
13 Pattons are being singled out when . .ink evidence 
14 | ^ . -, relative to SOTHH I l he ',v..~: houses, 
15 | it's actually quite a bit cleaner. 
16 MR. MCGINN: My contention is that there has 
17 been i 10 showii ig o £ an i} e vldenee anywhere that: t:he 
18 Pattons have been singled out. In cross examination I 
19 j thought Officer Malloy said yes, there are other 
20 violations in the area that they're working ''.'.n. 
21 THE COURT: I don't have any evidence of 
22 discriminatory enforcement of the Provo City 
23 Ordinances. The fact that we may have a junky 
24 neighborhood and that the defendant's property 
25 complies with the junky neighborhood, making it junky, 
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too, doesn't tell me that that's discriminatory 
enforcement of the ordinance as to the defendants. 
So we've got the testimony from this 
gentleman concerning what he's observed in the 
neighborhood, and that the defendants' property looks 
about the same as everybody else. I don't think we 
need anything else with respect to neighborhood 
description. 
Count I sets forth the claimed violations of 
the defendants with respect to 14-34-080, and that's 
what we're -- we are going to proceed under that or 
we're not in terms of any finding of violation or no 
violation. 
MR. HUMISTON: So are you sustaining the--
THE COURT: I'm sustaining the objection to 
the marking of photographs as exhibits to support the 
witness' testimony as to what the neighborhood looked 
like. That's what you wanted to do with them, that's 
what she said. 
MR. HUMISTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Patton, are you through 
with this gentleman? 
MS. PATTON: I have no further questions for 
the witness as this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 piece of it ended up at the dump. It was all very 
2 high quality tools and equipment that was taken 
3 directly out of the carport and there were witnesses 
4 to the fact that it all ended up in the garages and 
5 J carports of the city workers who took it. 
6 That's a fairly drastic punishment that's 
7 already been imposed on prior occasions, and in licjhc 
8 of that and, as I say, the Court's feeling that we've 
9 been here before. I feel that those things have been 
10 paid for as far as penalties sought by the City. This 
11 one should be addressed under its own merits. The 
12 City has said straight up that they wanted compliance 
13 and they have obtained compliance. Anything further 
14 beyond that basically amounts to overkill. 
15 I THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Patton, and 
16 gentlemen, when I wrote on this pad I have no 
17 intention to babysit you folks, that's really what I 
18 feel. I don't --by that, I'm not interested in the 
19 City running out to your home every 90 days and 
20 sending a report back to this Court to see if you've 
21 kept things like you should have. 
22 You're adults, you ought to know by now 
23 what's acceptable and what's not acceptable. You 
24 folks called a Mr. Keller to testify for you as your 
25 witness, and Mr. Keller described the condition of 
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your property at the time in question, who was your 
witness, as being ai 1 eyesore. It was a terrible 
neighborhood, he said, and yours -- and the condition 
of your property was consistent with he way things 
look in general, UL was bad I -— . -r ^ c.^-r^ a 
picture for me that wasn't very pretty, certainly not 
acceptable. 
So my attitude is this. You'v e been f :»iii id 
guilty cf Count: I, you've cleaned up the property 
wh •><"'*" * "-"iceptabl e to the city and the zoning 
requirement, and that's what I'm interested in. 
I'm going to impose the following sentence. 
*"• ' • a s p e c t !:, : Cc:>i :i r ' cl ass B m: sdemeanor as to 
Joan Patton, I'm going to impose a sentence of $500 
and 3 0 days in Utah County Jail. 
i " 'ill suspend all f rfi. r i N -I I i ill o f 
the time on the condition that the property remains in 
an acceptable condition, no further violation of the 
City for one y ear 
With respect to the case of Provo City vs. 
William Patton, I'm going to impose the same fine and 
the same penalty witl i i espect to time and wi 11 not --
will stay the execution of both the sentence and the 
fine on the condition that the property remains in the 
condition it is now for a oeriod of oi le year. 
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advance to ensure that things are kept tidy, for want 
of a better word'1 J'v.- you want to take some time to 
talk to Mr. McGinn about this? 
MS. PATTON: I would -- also for the record 
I wuuld like to object to en*? thing that was in --
that we asked for in the bill of particulars, which 
was the fence :'d like to put in a motion to dismiss i 
or ask the ...... ss : -^gueness and 
overbroad -- for the fact that the ordinance itself is | 
vague and overbroad. 
Tn -~ o rdi nai i c e s ay s t ha t a f r on t: y a r d f e n c e 
needs co be three feet, it doesn't sny higher on it, 
* * ay wide, it doesn't say • it said 1 can 
put up severa- three feet lenses, fc.ini i J ehaliemqe 
the ordinance for one thing, and I feel like that I j 
need to p.jt on record that I do object to this fence. j 
THE COURT: Ordinance. 
MS. PATTON: To this ordinance, I object to 
it, right. 
THE COURT: Okay. n^ vmi understand that I 
plead in abeyance concept? 
MS PATTON- l understand the plea in 
abeyance concept. 
THE COURT: Is that something -- okay. Do 
you want to take a minute to talk? 
then. 
COURT CLERK: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Let's see, today is — 
COURT CLERK: The hearing date will be April 
22nd at 1:30. 
THE COURT: All right, that gives you 
basically three months on that, and then--
MR. MCGINN: What time was the April 22nd? 
COURT CLERK: At 1:30. 
THE COURT: In the event you can't get this 
worked out, then you'd have a motion date for when you 
file motions. You need not come if you haven't filed 
any, okay? And then we'll set the matter for trial in 
May -- May 19th? 
COURT CLERK: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that would be for both 
cases, okay? I'll recognize his health problem today 
in being unable to appear today, and we'll set both 
cases together at the same time. 
MS. PATTON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you for your efforts. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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progress we cai 1 make. 
And in the meantime if unfortunately things 
can't be resolved and we come up with something that's 
mil t i 1a 1 1 y a c c ep t ab 1 e, t hen w e won I d have a t: i : :i a ] da t e 
down the road that we could aim for. 
I would request a trial date approximately 
three months away 
THE COURT: I would suggest that to give you 
time. 
I IR MCGINI II! i \ in, I I Is Pat ton might ask f DI: 
more time--
rather 
can't -
i know 
able 
give 
wl 
to 
1 rc 
months 
19 th It 
MS . PATT(» 
THE COURT 
MS. PATTON: 
than three. 
- - i - _ -*."\c 
vour Honor. 
: JL„ ti ii i ik: ) ou i leed? 
I was asking for five months 
MCGINN: That seems c 
- the reason I 
tlilr -:- m o n t h , 
resolve this. 
THE COURT: 
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